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Abstract 
What does the giving and receiving of disaster relief say about a democratic state’s 
engagement with justice and its responsibilities towards its citizens? This is the question that 
motivates the following paper, where an attempt is made to characterise the “relief state” 
through the example of the Indian state’s response to the super-cyclone in 1999 in Odisha on 
the eastern coast of India, and more recently, the devastating floods of 2008. The paper 
interrogates the norms that guide the state in its relief role, as well as the strategies deployed 
by disaster victims to access such relief. It argues that the ‘relief relationship’ between states 
and victims, who are also citizens, complicates the idea of the nation-state as a provider of 
just citizenship. Guided by contemporaneous debates about justice, rights and citizenship in 
India, the paper observes that the moral stance adopted by citizens is as important to the 
realisation of citizenship and its benefits as the formal enshrinement of rights. Through an 
intensive discussion of the norms and practices of disaster relief, it concludes that victimhood 
is the moral content of how citizens engage with the state after a disaster.  
Disaster relief, Citizenship, Justice, Rights, Environment, India 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
A disaster following from a natural hazard reveals a very particular dimension of the 
relationship that a state espouses with its population. State action in the face of a disaster is 
especially grave as populations are construed as innocent in the wake of a ‘natural calamity’ 
that they have no control over and cannot be blamed for causing. Democratic states in 
particular are obliged to provide relief to their citizens to ameliorate the severity of the effects 
of a disaster and to help victims cope.  
 
Disasters challenge the proponents of justice as the brunt of their consequences are unequally 
borne between and within communities. These inequalities have been emphasised within the 
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larger critical literature on vulnerability, risk and disasters (Enarson and Morrow, 1998; 
Cutter and Finch, 2008; Hilhorst and Bankoff, 2007; Oliver-Smith, 1996; Pelling, 2001 
Wisner, Blaikie et al, 2004). Relief itself cannot remedy fundamentally unjust distributions of 
resources and risks and must, as state colonial codes in India have mentioned, be viewed only 
as a small part of rural welfare and development policies. As an immediate panacea 
nevertheless and for the sheer scale at which it may be provided, the state’s disaster relief 
matters a great deal. But does the giving of disaster relief make the state, in this case in India, 
a more just one for its citizens? 
  
Moreover, as the papers in this special issue illustrate, the struggles for environmental justice 
transcend the boundaries of nation states, but states continue to act as the principal arbiters of 
justice for their citizens. Claims for environmental and social justice using the language of 
citizenship, rights and the nation have gained traction with many states, including India 
(Baviskar, Sinha and Phillip, 2006; Harris, 2011) and it seems worthwhile to examine the 
extent to which disaster relief has enabled the making of such claims, if at all. This paper 
highlights the peculiar nature of disaster relief which necessarily implies that recipients 
switch between being victims, deserving of state handouts, and citizens, by definition entitled 
to state assistance. It seeks to interrogate the precise nature of this ‘relief relationship’ by 
examining the normative bases of state relief provision, as well as the kinds of strategies that 
the victims of a disaster employ to access relief. 
In its consideration of the giving as well as the receiving of disaster relief, the paper treats 
norms or values as much as it does actual practices, thus bringing the two key elements that 
constitute the politics of disaster relief into its ambit. While the questions raised are mostly 
applicable to the Indian context, the paper draws from the hazard-prone state of Odisha, 
located on the coast of the Bay of Bengal
2
. The relief episodes discussed in this paper pertain 
to the super-cyclone of 1999 and more recently, to the devastating floods of 2008. 
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 theorises justice and citizenship in India, 3 
delineates the nature of the ‘relief state’, 4 studies the extent to which the relationship 
between disaster victims and the state mirrors citizenship practices elsewhere, and 5 
concludes. 
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2. THEORISING JUSTICE AND CITIZENSHIP IN INDIA 
The discourse of global environmental justice is appealing because it refers to the 
increasingly universalising and multi-scalar manifestation of contestations around justice 
(Newell and Sikor, this volume). But such a discourse serves a broader purpose as well. It 
stimulates an examination of the often ambivalent role of the nation-state as a provider of just 
citizenship. By turning the spotlight away from environmental movements and popular 
struggles as key sites for a ‘global’ environmental justice, to the obligations of sovereign 
states in the developing world that continue to dominate the daily experiences of justice for 
citizens, this paper complements the assessment of environmental justice in the global south 
being offered in this collection.  
Justice has been theorised richly, with emphasis being placed on its procedural and 
distributive aspects (Fraser and Honneth, 2003; Schlosberg, 2004). There is a substantial 
literature both on the structure of justice and the principles of distribution (Dobson, 1998), as 
there is on the procedural aspects of justice to ensure recognition (Fraser, 2003). Within 
environmental struggles in particular, demands for justice have been commonly articulated as 
‘rights’: ‘to claim a right is to register the strongest kind of claim for which our moral 
language provides (Jones, 1994: 49-50). Rights have the highest philosophical pedigree in 
that ‘they structure the form of governments, the content of laws and the shape of morality as 
it is currently perceived’ (Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2011). Menon writes, 
‘Justice is seen to be ensured by the winning, granting and protection of rights which are held 
by the citizen’ (1998: PE-3). But notions of justice are not universal and this means that 
particular rights-claims ‘derive their meaning and value only within their specific universes’ 
of justice (Menon, 1998: PE-5) and morality. It is this that distinguishes justice, a far more 
abstract and cosmopolitan notion that is open to a wide range of interpretations, from the law, 
which is a definite set of rules that seeks to codify any one particular ‘just meaning’. It 
follows that attempts to vest a single category of citizenship with ‘universal and inalienable 
rights’ in order to secure justice may be ‘misdirected’ (ibid.).  
In India, this critique bears special resonance as the founders of the constitution sought to 
create a ‘citizenship regime’ (Jayal, 2011) comprised of individuals who would be equal as 
citizens. This regime was motivated by the desire that citizenship would foster a sense of 
modern civic national-identity despite the prevailing ethnic and cultural diversity. But in the 
decades after 1950, this idea has been put to severe strain as a result of the inclusionary and 
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exclusionary effects of the ‘three great transformations’: lower caste mobilisation, Hindutva 
politics and neoliberal economic reform (Jayal, 2011; Ruparelia et al, 2011). Caste-based 
political parties of North India have created new forms of inclusion for the socially 
marginalised dalits and backward classes through better representation in political institutions 
and public employment (though this was heavily skewed towards elites from these sections 
who appropriated the new benefits). The new politics of religious nationalism has vitiated 
public discourse about religious minorities, within which extreme acts such as genocide 
against Muslims and the killing of Christian missionaries have sought to be legitimised. 
Economic reform in turn has produced its own exclusionary effects in terms of an ever 
growing distance of the poor from the consumption patterns of the middle and upper classes.  
Each of these transformations has ruptured the original citizenship project, and contributed to 
a social and political climate, where citizens would enter the political/public arena constituted 
by their ascriptive identities of caste and religion (Jayal, 2011: 154). The citizenship regime 
circa 2000 and later is far removed from the modernising crucible it was originally held to be. 
Jayal (2011) argues that these developments have severely compromised the idea of universal 
citizenship in India, i.e., of equal citizens with equal rights, and endangered the constitutional 
project of ‘social citizenship’ as articulated in the welfare-orientation of the Indian state. 
While the shift in economic policy has forced cutbacks in public spending compromising the 
state’s provision of social citizenship, the ‘obsession with cultural identities’ threatens to 
enforce the ‘primacy of cultural citizenship’ over notions of political and social citizenship 
that promise to go beyond such identities (Jayal, 2011: 154). More evidence of this 
phenomenon lies within contemporary debates on caste and religion-based quotas and sub-
quotas for constitutional affirmative action, aptly labelled as ‘pinched-up conceptions of 
citizenship’ (Mehta, 2012: 10).  
There have been a number of popular campaigns in recent years demanding that basics like 
education, employment, food and information be enshrined as justiciable rights. The 
campaigns were led by middle class intellectuals who relied upon the myriad resources of 
transnational networks, funding from international NGOs and crucially, the support of Left 
parties within parliament to have legislation passed (Harris, 2011: 137). The Supreme Court 
of India has played an absolutely vital role in the entire process, through critical rulings that 
have pressed the government to act urgently on various fronts- from education to food to 
work. Their significance in promoting an agenda of social citizenship within a general era of 
neoliberal economic reform cannot be underestimated (see Harris, 2011 for a critical review). 
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However, as Harris points out, ‘governments have enacted lots of social security 
legislation....but have rarely backed it up with financial allocations’ (2011: 138). Equally 
though, as Harris later acknowledges, these steps do respond to the moral outrage implicit in 
the daily violations of peoples’ basic rights.   
Nonetheless, the truth remains that for the vast majority of marginalised groups, whether 
Scheduled Tribes, lower castes, landless persons, and the dispossessed more generally, 
citizenship may be a formal entitlement but is not a substantiated claim. Premier political 
scientists examining the content of citizenship in India have accordingly focused on strategies 
adopted by marginalised groups to obtain benefits from the state in order to improve their lot. 
Amongst the most insightful studies on this subject is Chatterjee’s (2004) research on urban 
squatters in a Kolkata slum in West Bengal. This study reveals the ingenuity of slum dwellers 
in successfully extracting welfare resources from the state, such as funds from the Integrated 
Child Development Scheme (ICDS). The organisation of slum dwellers, labelled the Peoples’ 
Welfare Association, forged relationships with a variety of actors who would influence 
decision-makers in the government. These included local municipal officials, police officers, 
political party leaders and prominent middle class residents. Through the association, the 
‘community’ of squatters ‘illegally occupying’ public land also obtained a legal electricity 
connection!  
The marginalisation experienced by population groups like the urban squatters, and their 
informal and often underhand strategies for survival, led Chatterjee to conclude that in India, 
most inhabitants ‘are only tenuously and even then ambiguously and contextually, rights-
bearing citizens in the sense imagined by the constitution. They are not, therefore, proper 
members of civil society and are not regarded as such by the institutions of the state’ (2004, p 
38). However, he argues that they are not outside the domain of politics; instead, they 
constitute what he calls political society, where they enter into particular relationships with 
the state in order to access state resources. In order to access government functionaries, these 
groups try to create networks of influence with other groups in similar situations and 
importantly, with political representatives and trade unions that can help their cause. A key 
part of this strategy for the marginalised constituency to fashion itself as a population group 
that could receive the benefits of a governmental programme, such as the ICDS. 
Citizenship matters purely ‘for the suvidha (facilities)’ it can bring, reports Jayal (2011). This 
is the widely held view in the migrant settlements of Rajasthan where she carried out 
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ethnographic research. Here, in the border districts of Jodhpur and Jaisalmer, unfold the daily 
struggles of persons who have migrated ‘back’ to India from Pakistan after the demolition of 
the Babri Masjid in India. They are mainly dalit and adivasi communities that left Pakistan 
fearing repercussions after frenzied Hindu mobs tore down an ancient mosque in a northern 
Indian town (Ayodhya) in 1992.  Jayal (2011) documents that many lack formal proof of 
citizenship and are desperate to obtain official certifications like ration cards, caste 
certificates and Below Poverty Line (BPL) cards to get assistance from the state towards the 
fulfilment of their basic needs. She sums up the unfulfilled lure of citizenship eloquently, 
‘For those who do not have it yet, the magic key to all these goods (better quality of life and 
greater security) is citizenship. For those who do, there is acute disappointment at the promise 
of citizenship remaining unfulfilled’ (2011: 152) 
Given that actual access to the ‘goods of citizenship’ matters so much, Chatterjee’s analysis 
is particularly insightful. Even within the grim context of denial and distance (from 
authorities and benefits), his is a story of success, and the conclusions he draws about the 
methods employed to extract these goods are significant. He argues that the ability of these 
squatter populations to obtain welfare resources from the state through connections forged 
within political society depended not on claims that the state could treat as ‘justiciable rights’, 
but instead as moral claims that the state could not or did not dismiss. The explanation for 
this lay in the diffuse and heterogeneous modes of operation adopted by the state, which 
functions not as a homogenous bloc but rather as a highly differentiated entity where 
countless opportunities for negotiation, influence and compromise exist. This in fact is 
revealed in many studies on the functioning of the Indian state (Corbridge et al, 2005; 
Chhotray, 2011; Fuller and Harris, 2001; Pattenden, 2011; Shah, 2010). Moral claims made 
by population groups, even when they are not rooted in justiciable rights, are routinely 
mediated through state-centre political relations, as well as between those dispersing aid and 
receiving it
3
.  
Even as the struggles of environmental justice around the global South, including India, have 
drawn greater attention to the framing of rights as a key component of citizenship, the 
quotidian experience of subaltern and marginalised groups as citizens continues to rely on 
moral claims and negotiations. Indeed, this paper contends that the moral stance adopted by 
citizens with respect to state authorities and others in positions of power, and vice versa, is as 
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important to the realisation of citizenship and its benefits, as the formal enshrining of a right 
in law. Moreover, if rights ‘structure the shape of morality as it is currently perceived’ 
(Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2011), then surely how they are formulated, claimed 
and negotiated- regardless of their formal status- is intimately connected with the moral 
position taken. With this as a starting point, the paper will now examine both the normative 
content and the actual provision of the state’s disaster relief in order to derive additional 
lessons for just citizenship in India. 
3. THE RELIEF STATE 
In its characterisation of the ‘relief state’ in contemporary India, the paper will build on a rich 
literature concerning the relief functions of the colonial state (Dreze, 1994. The contribution 
that it seeks to make may be situated within a larger body of research described as ‘disaster 
politics’ (Albala-Bertrand, 1993; Pelling and Dill, 2009) especially as the subject of state 
disaster relief has received rather little attention here (Fred Cuny’s 1983 classic titled 
Disasters and Development remains an exception). Greater emphasis has been placed on the 
role of international actors in providing humanitarian aid and relief after a severe disaster 
(Clark, 2005; Korf, 2005; Pelling, 2003). In recent years however, scholars have focused on 
state relief following major disasters in India (Simpson and Corbridge, 2006; Simpson, 2008 
for the Gujarat earthquake of 2001 and Ray-Bennett, 2009; Samal et al, 2005 for the Odisha 
super-cyclone of 1999).  
3.1 Rationale for disaster relief and the ethics of assistance 
India has a coherent administrative structure for determining and delivering disaster relief. 
Successive Finance Commissions (constituted every 5 years) have consistently included 
guidelines on disaster relief, given its salience for centre-state fiscal relations. In 2005, the 
Parliament passed the National Disaster Management Act that envisaged the creation of the 
National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) as the apex body for disaster management 
in the country (GOI, 2005). The Act sets out the various aspects of state response to a disaster 
in subsequent phases (such as preparedness, response, evacuation and rescue, relief, 
rehabilitation and reconstruction amongst others). But while it clarifies the duties and powers 
of NDMA and the state governments for providing relief, it does not illuminate how exactly 
the state views its own obligations towards the victims of a disaster.  
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Clark et al (2012) write that in the international arena, the giving of aid and donations for 
relief by global actors, western states and their private citizens can exemplify considerations 
of ‘universal generosity’, a desire to give for the sake of compassion only and in a manner 
that ‘transcends politics’. But this is far from being an adequate framework for understanding 
why a sovereign state gives disaster relief to its citizens. Since the original Indian constitution 
does not specifically mention disaster relief, this paper looks to British colonial history, and 
in particular Dreze’s (1994) analysis of 19th century Famine Codes for some cues.  
The earliest famine codes were promulgated by the Famine Commission of 1880, with the 
purpose of giving ‘authoritative guidance to the local administration for the anticipation, 
recognition and relief of famines’ (Government of India or GOI 1880 referred to by Dreze, 
1994: 82). The Commission expressly titled this as a paternal ‘state obligation’ since ‘there is 
no doubt that a calamity such as a famine, exceptional in its nature and arising from causes 
wholly beyond human control......is one which in a country such as India wholly transcends 
individual effort and the power of resistance’ (ibid.: 76). Dreze is wary of concluding this 
rhetoric of duty was motivated by unbridled humanitarianism alone, and argues that a mix of 
factors is likely to have influenced this aspect of colonial thinking. These ranged from a 
desire to preserve political stability and the need to manage public opinion back in England, 
but also a sense of obligation to a population that was already reeling from the negative 
effects of colonial expansion (1994: 76). But whatever the precise rationale, even as the state 
expressed obligation, and a duty of care for people trapped in circumstances not of their 
making, it framed this obligation carefully.  
According to Dreze, the clear message contained in the famine codes was as follows: the state 
would provide relief to the victims of a famine through the organisation of massive public 
works at subsistence wages to all those who had sought it. Wages would be paid in cash and 
the works would aim to create ‘public assets’ such as roads and canals. In addition, there 
would be ‘gratuitous’ relief, but only to those who were unable to work on account of their 
physical conditions (illness, age, disability for example). Gratuitous, as the term connotes, is 
expressly non-legal and non-contractual and refers to something that has been done 
‘voluntarily’ out of ‘kindness or grace’ without ‘the giver recognising any liability or legal 
obligation’4. Dreze explains that this arrangement came about after a series of ‘self-acting’ 
tests by the Famine Commission to determine which forms of relief (labour in public works, 
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giving of cooked food, cash doles and so on) would be most effective in targeting those who 
genuinely needed it given the ‘weakness of the administrative structure’ (1994: 85).  
Clearly then, while the colonial administration was concerned about the prevention of 
starvation deaths, it was also strongly guided by considerations of financial economy. 
Besides, the Commission also frowned upon the provision of ‘unconditional’ (or gratuitous) 
relief. This was not so much for the inherently ‘immoral character of gratuitous relief’, but 
for fears of the adverse effects such relief might have on the existing rural ‘moral economy’ 
(Dreze, 1994: 83). The Famine Commission regarded that any unconditional relief must not 
have the effect of rendering irrelevant the existing practices of mutual assistance. By 
implication therefore, any gratuitous assistance given by the state should be an adjunct to 
public charity during the harsh times following a disaster, but not an easy substitute for it. 
The two key elements of the rationale for disaster relief and the ethics of state assistance are 
well summarised in the following passage from the Famine Commission Report, 1880. 
‘.....we have to consider the manner in which the proper recipients of public charity 
can be most effectually ascertained. The problem to be solved is how to avoid the risk 
of indiscriminate and demoralising profusion on the one hand, and of insufficient and 
niggardly assistance on the other- how to relieve all who really need relief, and to 
waste as little public money as possible in the process’ (GOI, 1880 cited in Dreze, 
1994: 87). 
These basic principles continue to inform the spirit of disaster relief in contemporary India, 
and as will be shown, the ethics of assistance guiding state policy as well. A consideration of 
the Odisha Relief Code (ORC) makes this abundantly clear. The ORC was derived from 
amendments made to the Odisha Famine Codes (of 1913 and 1933) in 1980, and then again 
in 1996. At the very outset is a clear declaration of the objectives of disaster relief: 
‘....to ensure that no one should die of starvation but also to prevent physical 
deterioration and destitution of the people and to enable them to resume their 
ordinary pursuits of life on return of better times and simultaneously to encourage the 
village community in making concerted and continuous efforts to fight a common 
misfortune. Boosting of the morale of the public in times of disasters is very much 
necessary (Government of Odisha or GOO, 1996: 2; italics added for emphasis). 
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The passage reveals a reiteration of the overriding objectives of death prevention through 
starvation besides the adoption of measures that would enable a resumption of ordinary 
livelihoods. There is also a strong sense that state relief must complement the efforts of the 
collective village community to face the disaster, which resonates with the reference to the 
rural moral economy mentioned earlier. Moreover, the ORC practically mirrors the Famine 
Codes in its emphasis on the provision of labour intensive work as the primary relief strategy, 
wherein gratuitous relief is given to those ‘who are incapable of earning their livelihood’ at 
the time of a natural calamity, and is in the form of food, clothes, shelter and other basic 
needs (also known as emergent relief). Then there is ex-gratia assistance given according to 
clearly devised norms by the central government for different types of loss including: kin, 
limb or eyes, crops, livestock, means of livelihood (like fishing nets) and so on (GOI, 2010a). 
Like other types of gratuitous relief, such assistance is not an obligatory entitlement of the 
state and is strictly given as a voluntary act of kindness. The spirit of such assistance is that 
the state recognises the loss suffered by the victims of a disaster, and wishes to alleviate their 
suffering, but ex-gratia assistance is not compensation. This is stated in the circulars of the 
central government. 
‘Financial assistance in the wake of natural calamities is towards relief and not for 
compensation of loss.....the main objective of the relief fund is to assist the affected 
persons to restart their economic activities. On the other hand, compensation is 
basically replacement of the damage in financial terms. Compensation is a part of a 
contractual agreement whereby unnatural dispossession of wealth and property is 
likely to be compensated. Insurance is one of such instruments. It is a legal 
obligation. On the other hand, relief is by way of gratuitous assistance as an 
immediate help to overcome the stress. It is generally understood that no country in 
the world is in position to fully compensate the losses incurred due to natural 
calamities’ (Ministry of Home Affairs, undated circular). 
  
The ethics of assistance are clear. The ‘relief state’ must not subsidise able bodied people 
who can take up physical work provided by the state. At the same time, such a state espouses 
generous concern for those who are not able to work, but is careful to maintain that state help 
is temporary at a time when normal village practices of mutual assistance are likely to have 
failed, to the disadvantage of the most vulnerable persons. It is also patent that gratuitous 
relief is not an entitlement being conferred to citizens who cannot demand it of the state.  
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3.2 The politics of ‘natural calamity’ 
These ethics appear to have a broader resonance beyond India. In an insightful history of 
disaster relief and welfare funding in the United States, Landis (1999) put forward the idea 
that there are two principal elements in any justification for disaster relief. The first is the 
‘naturalness’ of a calamity, and the second is the ‘deservedness’ of victims which is defined 
by their innocence. As the preceding discussion has shown, these were deemed to be 
mutually constitutive in the colonial and independent Indian state as well: fate not fault was 
what legitimated relief.  Landis’ (1999) paper also shows how campaigners for an expansion 
of state welfare in 19
th
 century America used this logic to argue that if ‘blameworthiness of 
claimants’ is what mattered, then there be no distinction between ‘bad weather’ and bad 
credit, and that the state ought to offer more help at the time of the great recession. In India 
however, the very nature of disaster politics has meant that any attempts to conflate ‘natural’ 
disasters with ‘economic’ ones have been resisted.  
Shaped by its colonial legacy, the Indian state has historically accorded great emphasis on the 
naturalness of the calamity in its relief role
5
. This is normalised into its relief parlance and in 
any discussion of funding arrangements or allocation norms. Firstly, the word ‘calamity’ 
appears in the two major funds available for relief: the National Calamity Contingency Fund 
(NCCF) and the Calamity Relief Fund (CRF). Great care is taken to list the different types of 
‘natural’ calamities that would merit relief from the state, but this matter has been 
contentious. For example, according to one official in the Odisha Special Relief Commission, 
Odisha suffers nearly 300-400 lightning deaths per year yet lightning does not appear in the 
list of calamities listed in the guidelines of the CRF
6
. He said that the state government had 
appealed several times for its inclusion to the central Finance Commission, and ultimately 
‘had to issue its own separate guidelines’ including lightning. The naturalness of a calamity is 
important for the discourse of disaster relief because it is ostensibly easy to demonstrate ‘the 
causal link between event and outcome’ (Landis, 1999) when the trigger event is a natural 
one, such as a flood or a hurricane.  
                                                          
5 The recently passed Disaster Management Act of 2005 has extended the definition of disaster to cover ‘man-made causes 
and accidents’ and the focus is on the ‘impact’ of the calamity, but there is a ‘need to have a concrete list of events’ under 
the Act (GOI, 2010b: 200). 
6 Interview with official at the Special Relief Commission, Cuttack, December 2009. 
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The Indian state is meticulous in its efforts to regulate such causality, and what is included in 
the list of ‘natural calamities’ is carefully regarded7. This approach is reflected in the 
bureaucratisation of categories of ex-gratia assistance, and the specification of the terms on 
which such assistance is offered. For example, although a disaster can kill immediately, or 
injure, traumatise or debilitate leading to death in subsequent weeks/months, the Indian state 
compensates only for death suffered either on the day or up to three days following the actual 
event.  
The literature on disaster politics has established how disasters constitute key political 
moments in the life of a society (Albala-Bertrand, 1993; Pelling and Dill, 2009). Not only do 
government responses to disasters echo their political visions, disasters also constitute 
important opportunities for states to ‘marshal their material and discursive powers’ in order to 
gain or improve popular legitimacy (Pelling and Dill, 2009: 4). In India, amongst the clearest 
signs that disasters present political opportunities for regimes is the manner of mobilisation of 
resources to fund disaster response efforts. There is a politics of declaration of a calamity as a 
‘national calamity’, which matters especially for mobilising international donor monies apart 
from facilitating discretionary releases from central funds. As section 4.1 will discuss in more 
detail, the particular politics of centre-state relations can and often does impact critically on 
whether a calamity is declared as national or not, and with what effects. 
3.3 Justice and disaster relief 
Before moving on to discussing the actualities of the relief relationship between the state and 
citizens that have been victimised by a disaster, this section will draw together some major 
implications for justice as evident in official norms of disaster relief. These are relevant as 
much for understanding how the state views disaster relief, as for assessing how citizens 
strategise to access the relief in particular ways.  
Theorists of justice in the Indian context have argued against it being an absolute value. The 
norms of ex-gratia assistance further reveal that while there is a solid concern with justice as 
due process in the giving of disaster relief to all those affected, there is less of an attempt to 
use disaster relief to seek justice as redistribution to remedy unfair consequences for different 
                                                          
7 Relief Commissions have sometimes gone beyond this strict reading of a ‘natural calamity’ in their actual work. The 
Special Relief Commissioner, Odisha, revealed that they had organized and run relief camps for a year in Kandhamal district 
in Odisha, the site of terrible Hindu-Christian conflicts, even though it was a ‘man-made disaster’ (Interview, Bhubaneswar, 
December 2009). 
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categories of recipients
8
. There is evidence of the former: ex-gratia payment for loss of kin 
based on the day of death with a uniform threshold for all (on or 3 days after the date of the 
disaster). Any threshold will exclude some, so the imposition of a threshold cannot in itself 
be regarded as unfair
9. In principle then, such a threshold clearly produces a set of ‘valid’ 
claimants, while excluding others, which may appear to be ‘unfair’ to those who are 
excluded, but the principle remains the same for everybody. The effects may also be 
potentially redistributive: a poorer household that has lost as many members in a cyclone as a 
richer one will receive the same amount of ex-gratia assistance as the latter, and hence, 
proportionately more than its income or wealth than its richer neighbour. The state is keen to 
institute norms and also procedures (such as through the establishment of dispute resolution 
fora to address any contests to the awarding of ex-gratia assistance) that will work similarly 
for all, in principle. 
There is much less evidence of justice as redistribution through the giving of ex-gratia 
assistance. Assistance for crop loss for example has been introduced for disaster victims by 
the new CRF norms of 2009. In Odisha, the state government awarded such assistance for the 
first time since the October 2008 floods. But according to the CRF guidelines, farmers must 
be able to produce formal ownership records (known as land pattas) in order to qualify for 
assistance. This gravely disadvantages sharecroppers who typically have no formal proof of 
their sharecropping arrangement, and yet sharecropping is widely practised throughout India 
in such informal terms. Primary research in Garadpur block of flood affected Kendrapara 
district revealed that sharecroppers invest in seeds, fertilisers and other input costs, but 
receive nothing if the crop is destroyed by a flood. Any crop loss assistance is pocketed 
solely by the landowner. The research also did not encounter any cases where landowners 
willingly gave sharecroppers a portion of the input subsidy. This raises questions of the 
degree to which different categories of beneficiaries are rendered visible to the state: 
landholders with proof of land ownership are ‘visible’ in bureaucratic terms but tenant 
cultivators or sharecroppers embedded in informal relationships are not. State officials are 
well aware of this, but are unable and/or unwilling to do anything concrete about this, and 
there have no concrete changes to the officials guidelines till date, despite shows of good 
intent
10
. 
                                                          
8 The author is grateful to the anonymous reviewer of this paper for this insight. 
9 The author is grateful to Lucio Esposito for this point. 
10 The then Special Relief Commissioner, GOO, said his office would be happy to provide ex-gratia assistance to 
sharecroppers who could submit proof of their tenancy arrangements.  
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The implications of these norms of justice for the concrete experiences of disaster victims are 
particularly serious. The following discussion will demonstrate on the one hand that the 
procedural aspects of disaster relief unfold highly unevenly in practice, and the lack of 
attention to redistribution through disaster relief continues to preserve the status quo, which 
disadvantages households that are shackled by economic and social structural constraints. 
4. THE RELIEF RELATIONSHIP 
The key question now posed is whether the relief relationship between disaster-affected 
persons and the state is a mere restatement of the practices of citizenship in India, as was 
discussed in section 2, or is it an exception, and if so, then in what respects? The paper first 
examines the relief relationship between the centre and the state government to show that 
disaster relief is firmly sited within the rough terrain of centre-state fiscal politics. It then 
appraises state-citizen interactions within two stages of disaster relief: pure or emergent relief 
and ex-gratia assistance.  
4.1 Centre-state fiscal politics 
Disaster relief is firmly accepted as the joint responsibility of the central and state 
governments. States have significant variations in their vulnerability to hazards, and poorer 
states like Odisha are often the most disaster prone. A decision was taken to establish the 
Calamity Relief Fund in course of the 9
th
 Finance Commission recommendations (1989-95), 
on the basis of centre-state contributions in a ratio of 75:25. State shares of CRF funding 
depended on the basis of average expenditures approved for the state over a ten year period 
ending 1988-89. The 11
th
 Finance Commission (2000-2005) created the National Calamity 
Contingency Fund (NCCF) to provide assistance to states for calamities of the ‘rarest 
severity’ beyond that which can be met by the CRF.  
There are clearly laid norms for the functioning of both these funds. CRF is held in the public 
account of the state, and the centre’s share is paid in two instalments, where the second 
instalment is to be released upon the receipt of states’ annual report on natural calamities 
furnishing details of relief expenditure incurred. The NCCF is held in the public account of 
the Government of India, and administered by a ‘High Level Committee’ comprising various 
central government ministers. Any claims on the NCCF are made through a memorandum 
submitted by the State which is then assessed by a central team, and its report further 
appraised by an inter-ministerial group which then makes recommendations to the high level 
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committee for release of funds. As CRF and NCCF money is not meant to be used for post-
disaster reconstruction, but only for relief, Additional Central Assistance (ACA) has been 
given to some states for severe calamities; Gujarat after the 2001 earthquake, Tamil Nadu 
after the 2004 Tsunami, Kashmir after the 2005 earthquake and Bihar after the 2008 Kosi 
floods. Odisha has been notably missing from this list of recipients.   
Beneath the financial architecture for relief financing lies a complex and messy field of 
personal and political negotiation to obtain the money required for various state responses. 
On October 21, days after the first cyclone, the New Indian Express (NIE)
 11
 reported that the 
Chief Minister, Gomango, had sought an assistance of 50 crore rupees
12
 from the National 
Fund for Calamity Relief. On October 25, the newspaper announced that the state 
government had requested clarification from the Prime Minister, Vajpayee, if the 50 crores 
‘central assistance’ that he had announced would in fact be an advance from the ‘plan fund’ 
(funds allocated to the state government as set out in the five year plans) or an additional 
grant. 
 
The situation was not necessarily clearer at the centre either. On November 13, NIE reported 
that the Centre had released an additional amount of 350 crores, and quoted Pranab 
Mukherjee, then a leading member of the Congress Parliamentary Committee, stating that the 
source of this money was unknown. The BJP Finance Minister, Yashwant Sinha was reported 
to have told Sonia Gandhi, the Congress head: ‘why are you worried about the colour of the 
money? This is a life and death situation’ (NIE November 13). This was in some senses an 
odd dynamic: a BJP led central government appearing keen to help out a Congress-led state 
government, with the Congress party leadership being cynical about the source of money, and 
can be interpreted as an opportunity used by the Congress party at the centre to criticise its 
rival in power. Further, an uneasy equation between the central Congress party leadership and 
the state Chief Minister was reported, with rumours that he would be given ‘the marching 
orders’ by Sonia Gandhi. The Congress headship, the press claimed, appeared to have ‘lost 
interest’ in Odisha and blamed Gomango for his weak handling of the situation (NIE 
November 13). 
 
                                                          
11 All subsequent newspaper articles referred to here will only mention the mention the month and date; the year is 1999 for 
all. 
12 A hundred crores equals one billion. 
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While Gomango eventually had to resign under pressure following controversies ostensibly 
related to his handling of the crisis, his sympathisers averred that this was simply a political 
opportunity utilised by his rivals. In an interview, nearly ten years on, Gomango said, ‘if 
there is no belief, relief will not come’, stressing his personal attempts to reach out to his 
counterparts and their responses
13. He continued, ‘…and when the super-cyclone hit Odisha, 
and not Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal, I telephoned and by chance, I got through to Basu 
and Naidu and Chief Ministers of another 10-12 states. By the time the cyclone had arrived, 
the relief materials had been sent from either side. This is bhagya (fate), it does not usually 
happen’. 
 
Not everything was down to fate of course. A very clear politics of definition had emerged, 
with the declaration of the super-cyclone as a ‘national calamity’ by the PM on the 31st of 
October. He went on to ‘announce’ 100 crores (1 billion) from the National Fund for 
Calamity Relief as an appropriate response to the ‘extraordinary situation’ being experienced 
in Odisha, and the state government’s (legitimate) request for it to be treated as a national 
calamity. The tag ‘national’ calamity removes responsibility from the state government’s 
shoulders alone, and is seen as a necessary prerequisite for mobilising discretionary funds 
from the centre. By the 13th of November, Congress party politicians were clamouring for 
the disaster to be ‘treated’ as a national calamity, on the grounds that mere lip-service of 
declaration was not enough. They argued that it should be used effectively to get 
‘international funds’ for reconstruction, including soft loans from the World Bank (NIE, 
November 13).  
 
Although money did pour in from various international donors (and these figures have not 
been aggregated by the government), in the end, the state received less money from the 
central government than it had requested. Figures released by the state government placed the 
amount of cash received at 828.15 crores, a fraction of the 6243.956 crores that were 
demanded. Years after the super-cyclone, key state bureaucrats have openly spoken of their 
discontent with the ‘stepmotherly’ treatment doled out by the centre, which is seen both to 
disburse more funds, and more promptly, to other states than to Odisha. This discussion 
establishes that the state government executes disaster relief within an extremely politicised 
                                                          
13 Interview with Giridhar Gomango, Bhubaneswar, December 2009 
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context, and is constrained by the availability of resources from which to give ex-gratia and 
other kinds of assistance. 
 
4.2 Citizenship as victimhood 
From the outset, the symbolism of disaster relief is about a state coming to the assistance of 
innocent, helpless persons in distress. It is no coincidence that disaster affected persons 
played their part in fulfilling their counterpart roles as victims, both passive as well as 
aggressive. 
When the super-cyclone struck the coast of Odisha in 1999, it took days, and in many places, 
weeks for the state to reach its relief provisions to disaster victims. But not only were there 
physical hurdles like damaged roads, collapsed trees and flash floods which made relief 
delivery difficult, there was also the severely anti-social behaviour of desperate and 
opportunistic sections of the affected populations that engaged in widespread looting of food 
and other essential commodities from relief trucks
14
. Such aggressive behaviour amounting to 
vandalism grew more audacious with each passing day in the immediate aftermath of the 
super-cyclone. It led to the virtual abandonment of trucks on principal roads, including the 
national highway number 5 from the capital city (Bhubaneswar) to other major towns 
(Cuttack). Roadside villages closer to district headquarters were at an obvious advantage 
here, and trucks meant to take relief into interior villages on the sea coast often never reached 
their destination.  
The state responded by strengthening security visibly, with armed police vehicles being sent 
to accompany relief materials (NIE, November 3). The state vigilance department got 
involved, and formed ‘eight special squads’ to ensure the smooth distribution of relief 
materials and also to stop the hoarding and black marketing of essential commodities (NIE, 
November 4). Realising the limits of its measures, the state appealed to the people for self-
vigilantism, to ‘control’ the anti-social elements. Very soon, looting became a public order 
issue and the state government had to resort to airdropping essentials, which immediately put 
more able-bodied victims ahead in the game. Intense fighting broke out when the odd relief 
truck arrived in roadside villages in the worst affected block (Erasama in Jagatsinghpur 
district). These men also prevented the trucks from reaching remote, sea-side villages, whose 
                                                          
14 Similar experiences have been reported after disasters in other places too; such as Gujarat after the 2001 earthquake 
(Simpson, 2008).  
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residents bitterly recall these incidents even ten years later. Relief materials were also 
routinely stolen from ill-secured panchayat
15
 buildings. Above the chaos, there were fights 
over ‘criteria’ for distribution, which were neither clearly laid down by the panchayat 
functionaries in charge, nor understood by the gathered crowds. 
If violent aggression on the part of men was one side to the claiming of disaster relief as 
victims, passive victimhood in the form of beggary on the part of the old, the infirm and other 
vulnerable sections was another. On November 16, 1999, the NIE reported how people, 
especially the elderly, injured and sick, ‘crawled out of their collapsed houses to beg for food 
and polythene’. Desperate villagers also lay down their children on the roads as a part of their 
begging tactics. They abandoned and disowned their old parents to make them ‘eligible’ for 
assistance from NGOs targeted for those without any family. These actions established the 
extremely dehumanising character of the experience that is relief, and represented a low point 
in the relationship between people and the state. Since 1999, the Odisha state government has 
taken several important measures to make relief delivery more effective through 
improvements in road networks, better levels of emergency food stocks, and superior 
coordination amongst relief officials. Fewer incidents of looting and beggary were reported 
after the 2008 floods, though the mechanics of relief access still disadvantage women, the 
infirm and elderly persons. General ill-being and trauma after a disaster and the physically 
arduous nature of queuing up for relief, even when distributed relatively peacefully, are the 
major factors. 
 
But relief too, this paper argues, is given in two stages. These reported incidents occurred 
during the first stage of relief, which is also referred to as ‘pure’ or ‘emergent’ relief in 
official parlance. The second stage of relief follows after the immediate aftermath of a 
disaster, when victims weigh the damage suffered and seek ex-gratia assistance from the state 
for losses in different pre-determined categories. While the first stage of relief provision and 
access often involved blatant victimhood expressed through aggressive looting and 
dehumanizing beggary, by the second stage, a more complex form of such ‘citizenship as 
victimhood’ practice had emerged.  The politics of assessment for potential disaster related 
benefits tended to follow a similar pattern to those observed for the more usual certifications 
of poverty for welfare benefits (Corbridge et al, 2005). Poorer households were also severely 
disadvantaged by their inability to command the means needed to influence critical 
                                                          
15 A three tier system of elected local self-government at the district, block and village levels in India. 
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gatekeepers in order to obtain these benefits (Pattenden, 2011 for a discussion on 
‘gatekeeping’ in India). But quite remarkably, the state itself adopted a stance of 
uncharacteristic leniency in its response to individual strategising and attempts at influence. 
Some examples of the Odisha state’s behaviour in this respect will illustrate. 
The super-cyclone of 1999 was unprecedented in scale, and took the state’s relief machinery 
by surprise. Government Revenue Inspectors (RIs) were given the task of carrying out visual 
field-level assessments to determine loss. However, the sheer scale of this mission amidst the 
extraordinarily difficult physical circumstances overwhelmed the assessors. RIs occupy an 
influential position within the local power matrix given their usual functions associated with 
land tax collection, land registration and so on.  There were numerous reports of them 
exploiting the general chaos and lack of transparency together with sarpanches (panchayat 
heads) to put persons on different claimants’ lists, even when they had no case, in exchange 
for some money. 
After the super-cyclone, assistance was given for damage to house and loss of kin. 
Respondents contacted during our primary research in the worst affected parts complained of 
grave discrepancies with respect to receipts of ex-gratia for loss of kin. In contrast, most 
respondents with damaged kutcha (mud) houses recalled receiving the correct amount (a 
modest 3500 rupees) and recollections of bribes having been paid to RIs were few. Ex-gratia 
amounts for deaths however were relatively large (75,000 rupees per life lost), and the stories 
of nepotism recounted by survivors involved not just RIs but also tehsildars (head of the 
tehsil, a unit of jurisdiction of the revenue administration equivalent to the block), sarpanches 
and government lawyers. For example, one man in Kalabedi, a small coastal village within 
Ersama block, who had lost his mother in the cyclone, claimed to have paid 15,000 rupees in 
all (to lawyer, sarpanch and tehsildar) in order to have various documents signed and 
processed.  
Assessment procedures have been considerably ‘tightened’ in the years since. In 2008, the 
Special Relief Commissioner of Odisha decided to send out composite teams of assessors, 
and not the lone RI, with the aim of creating an environment of mutual vigilance during 
assessment. The decision was also taken to make payments by cheque, and stop cash 
payments altogether, in a bid to minimise cuts for RIs and sarpanches.  
But despite these innovative measures, primary research undertaken after the 2008 floods 
showed that the possibilities for discretion in assessment remained. By this time, the 
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Government of India had begun awarding ex-gratia assistance after a disaster in more 
categories, including personal injury, crop loss and loss of livelihoods means (such as 
artisanal trade equipment). The amounts awarded were also larger than in 1999. Our research 
in Garadpur block of Kendrapara district revealed numerous cases of ‘full’ house damage 
assistance being sanctioned, when only ‘partial’ damage or even no damage had been 
suffered. Assistance for crop loss beyond the prescribed ceiling had also been given to larger 
landowners, whereas many smallholders did not receive the prescribed minimum assistance. 
People manipulated their situation actively, and were often guilty of voluntarily offering to 
pay bribes to assessors even when none were demanded.  
The most common malpractice was to bribe the RI a sum of money, often with the 
connivance of his junior staff such as a peon, and seek inclusion in the ‘full damage to house’ 
list. Not everyone was clear about what was being offered or what they were due, which led 
to further offers of incentive payments by recipients. But despite such lack of clarity, people 
were generally aware of the major categories of assistance on offer, and did their utmost to 
claim these as best as they could. This echoed the strategies adopted by prospect recipients of 
benefits under regular state development schemes. Much like people who seek inclusion in 
the state’s Below Poverty Line list (BPL), even when they did not meet official criteria, many 
recipients of disaster relief manipulated their positions and connections to extract state 
resources for themselves. This severely disadvantaged those without the cash or connections 
to influence the gatekeepers to these resources. 
But here, they were able to go even further, vindicated by their moral stance, genuine as well 
as adopted, as the hapless victims of loss. Their strategies mirrored the norms of relief 
contained within India’s disaster codes, which harp on the innocence of victims caught out by 
natural calamities but are equally careful about refraining from enshrining relief as a 
justiciable right of citizens. Indeed, the strategic use of loss as a resource to bargain for more 
assistance from the state is carried out in the full knowledge that such assistance is not really 
a right with a definitive meaning and extent, but a temporary bounty, the provenance of 
which lay in the disaster itself. This was matched by a stance of leniency from the state, 
which would be unheard of for regular development schemes. After the 2008 floods, the 
Special Relief Commission issued an instruction to all Revenue Inspectors to ‘err on the side 
of generosity’ while assessing damage16. At the same time, such leniency was not 
                                                          
16 As reported by the senior official himself in a public workshop in Bhubaneswar, November, 2010. 
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countenanced in all aspects of disaster relief operations, and certainly people were not able to 
bargain for amounts greater than those set out in the CRF norms. There were one or two 
reported cases where recipients, angered by the successful manipulation of a few dominant 
persons, took on an active role as ‘aware citizens’ by complaining to the district 
administration for actions to be taken against corrupt lower functionaries.   
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper has tried to explore dimensions of justice both in the way the Indian state 
approaches disaster relief, and within the actions and strategies adopted by potential 
recipients in accessing such relief. Disasters present key challenges for the idea of justice, in 
their potential to affect differently positioned groups in extremely unequal ways. The focus of 
this paper lay in examining how exactly disaster relief is conceptualised within the Indian 
state, and what this means for the ability of victims to obtain this relief. As the particular 
point of interest is the range of state-people relationships around a disaster, the paper views 
justice through the lens of citizenship and rights.  
Citizenship in India has been grounded within an idealistic conception of individuals as equal 
citizens, whose participation in the public arena as members of the modern nation state would 
serve as a force capable of transcending ascriptive identities. Six decades of politics since 
independence have shown it be anything but this, and as a leading columnist in a prominent 
Indian daily wrote, there are dangers today of being ‘back to the procrustean bed of identity’ 
(Mehta, 2012). Besides, while advancements have been made in extending the purview of 
justiciable rights, citizens (and non-citizens, in the formal sense) rely heavily on a maze of 
underhand negotiations and appeals to various functionaries, officials and other notables to 
lay their hands on the goods of citizenship, whether this is subsidised grain, elementary 
education or an electricity connection. This sobering state of a political idea as lofty as 
citizenship contributed to the main question for this paper: is disaster relief articulated as an 
express right or entitlement of citizenship, and does this matter? 
To respond, the paper first presents a detailed account of the Indian state in its ‘relief’ mode. 
Through an analysis of colonial famine and contemporary relief codes of the state, the paper 
observes that the state provides relief at times of disaster out of a sense of paternal obligation 
towards its people. But considerations of financial economy and the reluctance to substitute 
for what is presumed to exist by way of a local moral economy are both significant.  And so, 
this ‘obligation’ is carefully hedged by norms that would safeguard against ‘excessive’ giving 
22 
 
to ‘undeserving’ recipients, and there is much reiteration that any relief provided is voluntary 
and gratuitous. Relief is not explicitly articulated as a formal right of citizenship.  
The paper then goes on to consider the extent to which the actual giving and receiving of 
disaster relief resembles the observed practices of citizenship in India. Through a case study 
of the Odisha super-cyclone, the paper argues that much like any other development or 
welfare initiative in India, the provision of relief is embedded within macro-level political 
economy of centre-state fiscal politics. It then draws upon micro-level politics within cyclone 
and flood affected sites to establish that on the whole, victims that are physically, socially and 
economically disadvantaged also suffer in their ability to access relief. But it goes beyond 
this relatively unsurprising finding to identify a deeper moral stance of victimhood, both 
passive and active, expressed in distinctive ways at different stages of the relief process. The 
paper concludes that victimhood is the moral content of how citizens engage with the state 
after a disaster.  
The paper also shows how the state responds with an uncharacteristic leniency towards 
popular attempts at manipulation of loss for getting the maximum ex-gratia assistance 
possible. Although this may be understood as a ‘state of exception’, in reality, the moral or 
political imperative for the state to act ‘generously’ itself magnifies the socially regressive 
practices of capturing state resources that exist in ‘normal’ developmental activities17. 
Besides, it entrenches the prevailing status quo, as typically the more socially and 
economically dominant persons are able to effectively manipulate the situation to their 
benefit. 
Two further lessons may be drawn from such a ‘relief relationship’ for just citizenship. First, 
the actual experience of disaster relief denies ‘justice as due procedure’ as it does ‘justice as 
redistribution’ to its recipients. As for the latter, it is quite clear that there is no attempt by the 
state to use disaster relief as an instrument for redistribution. On the other hand, provisions 
guiding ex-gratia assistance disadvantage historically subordinate categories like 
sharecroppers, many of whom are also landless farmers. As for the former, the situation is 
more complex. At one level, disaster relief can level the playing field for poorer households 
who stand to receive just as much assistance for losses as richer households, and this could be 
potentially progressive in its implications. This is especially true for categories as the loss of 
kin where the value of human life is the same. Even in other cases such as ex-gratia for crop 
                                                          
17 The author is grateful to the anonymous reviewer of this paper for this point. 
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loss, there are ceilings that dictate against assistance to large farmers who potentially stand to 
weather huge losses during disasters. However, the realities of obtaining such assistance 
disadvantage many poorer households lacking the resources to influence the institutions and 
individuals that do not honour the ‘fair’ procedures established by the state. . 
Second, perhaps like with many other messy dealings between the state and citizens in India, 
recourse to a very specific moral stance is central to the negotiation of disaster relief. Citizens 
appeal to state paternalism (even when expressed as limited obligation) and leniency through 
an exaggerated display of victimhood to get what they can, and any moral claims they may 
exercise in this respect do seem to matter more than formal entitlements or rights. Whether 
the casting of disaster relief as a constitutionally enforceable right would make much of a 
difference is an impossible question to answer. In a fast moving country where creedless 
information and progressive ideas seem to be locked in an intense fight with the stubborn 
baggage of social difference, institutional decay and dubious morality, there is always room 
for surprise. 
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